



STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FAIR POLITICAL PRACTICES COMMISSION
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February 4, 2021

George S. Cardona
Interim City Attorney
City of Santa Monica
City Attorney's Office
1685 Main Street, Room 310
Santa Monica, California 90401

Re: Your Request for Advice
Our File No. A-20-149

Dear Mr. Cardona:

This letter responds to your request for advice regarding the Political Reform Act (the "Act") and Government Code section 1090, et seq.¹ Please note that we are only providing advice under the Act and Section 1090, not under other general conflict of interest prohibitions such as common law conflict of interest.

Also, note that we are not a finder of fact when rendering advice (*In re Oglesby* (1975) 1 FPPC Ops. 71), and any advice we provide assumes your facts are complete and accurate. If this is not the case or if the facts underlying these decisions should change, you should contact us for additional advice.

We are required to forward your request regarding Section 1090 and all pertinent facts relating to the request to the Attorney General's Office and the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office, which we have done. (Section 1097.1(c)(3).) We did not receive a written response from either entity. (Section 1097.1(c)(4).) We are also required to advise you that, for purposes of Section 1090, the following advice "is not admissible in a criminal proceeding against any individual other than the requestor." (See Section 1097.1(c)(5).)

QUESTIONS

1. Do the conflict of interest provisions of the Act or Section 1090 prohibit Santa Monica Councilmember Oscar de la Torre from participating in governmental decisions relating to pending litigation against the City, including a potential settlement agreement, where his spouse is a named plaintiff in the lawsuit?

¹ The Political Reform Act is contained in Government Code Sections 81000 through 91014. All statutory references are to the Government Code, unless otherwise indicated. The regulations of the Fair Political Practices Commission are contained in Sections 18110 through 18997 of Title 2 of the California Code of Regulations. All regulatory references are to Title 2, Division 6 of the California Code of Regulations, unless otherwise indicated.

2. Do the conflict of interest provisions of the Act or Section 1090 prohibit Councilmember de la Torre from participating in governmental decisions relating to pending litigation against the City, including a potential settlement agreement, where his spouse is the Communications Officer for a nonprofit organization that is also a named plaintiff in the lawsuit?

CONCLUSIONS

1. No. As explained below, neither the Act nor Section 1090 prohibits Councilmember de la Torre from participating in governmental decisions relating to the City's pending litigation, including a potential settlement agreement, where his spouse is a named plaintiff.

2. No. As explained below, neither the Act nor Section 1090 prohibits Councilmember de la Torre from participating in governmental decisions relating to pending litigation against the City, including a potential settlement agreement, where his spouse is the Communications Officer for a nonprofit organization that is also a named plaintiff.

FACTS AS PRESENTED BY REQUESTER

You are the Interim City Attorney for the City of Santa Monica. In November of 2020, Oscar de la Torre was elected to serve as a member of the Santa Monica City Council and assumed his duties as a Councilmember on December 8, 2020. Prior to being elected to the City Council, Councilmember de la Torre served as an elected member of the governing board of the Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School District ("SMMUSD") for approximately 18 years.

The City of Santa Monica ("City") is currently the defendant in pending litigation challenging the City's use of an at-large election system to elect its City Council members. The original complaint in the litigation was filed on April 12, 2016 by three plaintiffs: Pico Neighborhood Association ("PNA"), Maria Loya (the spouse of Councilmember de la Torre), and Advocates for Malibu Public School.

The original complaint alleging violations of California Voting Rights Act ("CVRA") and California Equal Protection Clause did not seek damages, but did seek an award of attorneys' fees, costs, and litigation expenses. A First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), which again included alleged violations of the CVRA and California Equal Protection Clause, was filed in 2017 by PNA and Ms. Loya. The FAC did not seek damages, but did seek an award of attorneys' fees, costs, and litigation expenses.

The litigation proceeded to trial, judgment, and appeal based on the allegations in the FAC. After the trial, the court issued judgment in favor of plaintiffs on both of their causes of action in 2019. Plaintiffs' attorneys then filed a motion seeking approximately \$902,000 in costs and the City filed a motion to strike/tax those costs to significantly reduce them. Plaintiffs' attorneys also filed a motion seeking an award of more than \$22 million in attorneys' fees pursuant to a provision of the CVRA. Pursuant to an agreement between the parties, the City's response to the fee motion, and the

hearings regarding costs and fees have been continued to follow the resolution of proceedings in the Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court.²

Councilmember de la Torre has advised that there is no obligation on the part of him, his spouse, or PNA to pay any attorneys' fees or costs in connection with the litigation, and that his understanding is that the plaintiffs' attorneys would seek to recover fees and costs only from the City. Councilmember de la Torre has further advised that if plaintiffs' attorneys do not recover any fees or costs from the City, they have no ability to collect costs or fees from him, his spouse, or PNA. Finally, Councilmember de la Torre has orally advised that there is no arrangement under which any portion of any recovery from the City of attorneys' fees or costs would flow to him, PNA, or his spouse; any entity controlled, directly or indirectly, by him, PNA, or spouse; or any entity that employs or would otherwise provide any financial benefit to him or his spouse.³

PNA raises a small amount of money through modest membership dues, and its annual budget is consistently less than \$5,000. PNA has no employees and engages in no commercial transactions. Rather, PNA's board – usually consisting of about 12 residents who are unpaid volunteers – meets approximately once a month to discuss issues pertinent to the Pico Neighborhood, and advocates for the interests of the Pico Neighborhood residents. According to the PNA website, it was “[e]stablished in 1979, the PNA is a non-profit organization that has been involved in a wide variety of issues – crime & safety, housing, neighborhood conditions, commercial development, City Hall watch, youth activities, parks, and traffic control.”⁴

During his recent City Council campaign and as of November 2020, Mr. de la Torre was serving as chair of the PNA board. However, Mr. de la Torre has advised that following his election to the City Council, he resigned from his position as chair of the PNA board. You stated by email dated January 22, 2021, that the list of Board Members from the PNA website identifies his spouse as the “Communications Officer” for PNA. As Councilmember de la Torre and his spouse have always volunteered, they have never received any compensation from PNA.

ANALYSIS

The Act

Section 87100 prohibits any public official from making, participating in making, or otherwise using his or her official position to influence a governmental decision in which the

² The City appealed and the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment. Plaintiffs filed a Petition seeking review by the California Supreme Court, which granted review in October 2020 only on a limited question relating to the CVRA claim. Should plaintiffs ultimately prevail, the City anticipates returning to the trial court for resolution of the pending fee and cost motions.

³ By letter dated November 30, 2020, Councilmember de la Torre confirmed that he has no financial interest in the outcome of the instant lawsuit. At the outset of the case, his spouse and PNA both agreed that they have no right to any attorneys' fees or costs recovered in that case. Moreover, the attorneys representing his spouse and PNA agreed that they would handle the lawsuit pro bono and pay all associated costs.

⁴ See <https://pnasantamonica.wordpress.com/board-members>

official has a financial interest. Pertinent to your facts, the Act's conflict of interest provisions apply to financial interests based on the following:

- An interest in a business entity⁵ in which the official has a direct or indirect investment of \$2,000 or more (Section 87103(a)); or in which the official is a director, officer, partner, trustee, employee, or holds any position of management. (Section 87103(d).)
- An interest in a source of income to the official, including promised income, which aggregates to \$500 or more within 12 months prior to the decision. (Section 87103(c).)
- The official's interest in his or her personal finances and those of immediate family members. (Section 87103.)

According to the facts, neither Councilmember de la Torre nor his spouse has ever received, nor have they been promised, any compensation from PNA, and there are no other facts to suggest PNA is a source of income to them. Additionally, Councilmember de la Torre does not have a business interest in PNA because, as a nonprofit organization, PNA is not a "business entity" as defined by the Act. (Section 82005.) Finally, there are no facts suggesting decisions related to the pending lawsuit will have any financial effect on his or his immediate family's personal finances. Therefore, based on the facts provided, Councilmember de la Torre does not have a disqualifying conflict of interest under the Act in future City Council decisions related to the instant lawsuit.

Section 1090

Section 1090 generally prohibits public officers, while acting in their official capacities, from making contracts in which they are financially interested. Section 1090 is concerned with financial interests, other than remote or minimal interests, that prevent public officials from exercising absolute loyalty and undivided allegiance in furthering the best interests of their agencies. (*Stigall v. City of Taft* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 565, 569.) Section 1090 is intended not only to strike at actual impropriety, but also to strike at the appearance of impropriety. (*City of Imperial Beach v. Bailey* (1980) 103Cal.App.3d 191, 197.)

Under Section 1090, the prohibited act is the making of a contract in which the official has a financial interest. (*People v. Honig* (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 289, 333.) A contract that violates Section 1090 is void. (*Thomson v. Call* (1985) 38 Cal.3d 633, 646.) The prohibition applies regardless of whether the terms of the contract are fair and equitable to all parties. (*Id.* at pp. 646-649.) Finally, when Section 1090 applies to one member of a governing body of a public entity, the prohibition cannot be avoided by having the interested board member abstain. Instead, the entire governing body is precluded from entering into the contract. (*Thomson, supra*, at pp. 647-649; *Stigall, supra*, at p. 569; 86 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 138, 139 (2003); 70 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 45, 48 (1987).)

You have asked whether Councilmember de la Torre may participate in governmental decisions concerning a potential settlement agreement⁶ between plaintiffs and the City. The

⁵ Section 82005 defines a "business entity" as any organization or enterprise operated for profit, including but not limited to a proprietorship, partnership, firm, business trust, joint venture, syndicate, corporation or association.

determinative question here is whether he has a financial interest in a potential settlement agreement.

The term “financially interested” contained in Section 1090 has been defined as follows:

The phrase ‘financially interested’ as used in Government Code section 1090 means any financial interest which might interfere with a city officer’s unqualified devotion to his public duty. The interest may be direct or indirect. It includes any monetary or proprietary benefit, or gain of any sort, or the contingent possibility of monetary or proprietary benefits. The interest is direct when the city officer, in his official capacity, does business with himself in his private capacity. The interest is indirect when the city officer, or the board of which he is a member, enters into a contract in his or its official capacity with an individual or business firm, which individual or business firm, by reason of the city officer's relationship to the individual or business firm at the time the contract is entered into, is in a position to render actual or potential pecuniary benefits directly or indirectly to the city officer based on the contract the individual or business firm has received.

(88 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 32, 36.)

Councilmember de la Torre’s spouse

Initially, we note that under Section 1090, an official always has an interest in the community and separate property income of the official’s spouse. (*Thorpe v. Long Beach Community College Dist.* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 655; 89 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 69 (2006)). Councilmember de la Torre would therefore have a prohibitive financial interest in any potential settlement agreement resulting in a monetary benefit or liability of his spouse based on her status as a plaintiff in the instant lawsuit. According to the facts, however, neither he nor his spouse has any financial interest, direct or indirect, in the outcome of the lawsuit, including any future settlement agreement. There is no obligation on the part of him or his spouse to pay any attorneys’ fees or costs in connection with the litigation, and no arrangement under which any portion of any recovery from the City of attorneys’ fees or costs would flow to him or his spouse.

Accordingly, Councilmember does not have a financial interest in any potential settlement agreement related to the lawsuit based on his spouse’s status as a plaintiff therein.

PNA

⁶ The litigation against the City may be resolved under a settlement agreement. “A settlement agreement is a contract, and the legal principles which apply to contracts generally apply to settlement contracts.” (*Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick* (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 810-811, citing *Gorman v. Holte* (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 984, 988; see also 91 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 1 (2008); 86 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 142 (2003) [Section 1090 would prohibit a public official from participating in a settlement agreement in which the official is financially interested, and the body in which the official is a member could not enter the contract].)

In addition to being a plaintiff in the lawsuit, Councilmember de la Torre's spouse is the Communications Officer for the other plaintiff, PNA. You have therefore asked whether Councilmember de la Torre would have a financial interest in any settlement agreement resulting in a monetary payment that would benefit PNA. Importantly, the Legislature has created various statutory exceptions to Section 1090's prohibition where the interest involved is deemed a "remote interest," as defined in Section 1091 or a "noninterest," as defined in Section 1091.5. If a noninterest is present, the public official's abstention is generally not required, and the contract may be made by the agency.

Section 1091.5(a)(8) establishes that an officer is not interested in a contract if his or her interest is:

That of a noncompensated officer of a nonprofit, tax-exempt corporation, which, as one of its primary purposes, supports the functions of the body or board or to which the body or board has a legal obligation to give particular consideration, and provided further that this interest is noted in its official records.

For purposes of this paragraph, an officer is "noncompensated" even though he or she receives reimbursement from the nonprofit, tax-exempt corporation for necessary travel and other actual expenses incurred in performing the duties of his or her office.

According to the facts, Councilmember de la Torre's spouse volunteers as the Communications Officer for PNA, a nonprofit organization. In addition, based upon the description of issues it addresses, the primary purpose of dealing with crime & safety, housing, youth activities, parks, and traffic control supports important functions of the City. Therefore, even if a settlement agreement would result in a monetary payment that would benefit PNA, Councilmember de la Torre would have a noninterest in the agreement. However, should Councilmember de la Torre participate in such an agreement, he must disclose his interest in the City Council's official records.

Accordingly, for purposes of the Act, Councilmember does not have a disqualifying conflict of interest in City Council decisions concerning the instant lawsuit against the City. For purposes of Section 1090, he is not financially interested in any future settlement agreement based on his spouse's status as a plaintiff, and he has a noninterest in any future settlement agreement resulting in a monetary payment that would benefit PNA.

If you have other questions on this matter, please contact me at (916) 322-5660.

Sincerely,

Dave Bainbridge
General Counsel

By: *Jack Woodside*
Jack Woodside
Senior Counsel, Legal Division

JW:aja